

Il biocentrismo individualistico di Taylor

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Introduzione al biocentrismo (o ecocentrismo?) di Paul Taylor

I contributi di Paul Taylor alla comprensione ed elaborazione di un nuovo concetto di giustizia interspecifica è di sicura importanza. L'approccio di Taylor al problema ha i connotati di una filosofia della vita organica che prende forma dal concetto di "interesse" veicolato dal pensiero di Tom Regan, anche se presenta sostanziali differenze.

Il modello proposto si basa sulla considerazione dell'appartenenza di tutti gli esseri viventi alla comunità di vita terrestre. In quanto appartenenti noi stessi alla comunità di viventi della Terra, siamo in grado di comprenderne le dinamiche e di trovare soluzioni comuni, non ché di comprendere (teoricamente) le esigenze degli altri appartenenti alla comunità. L'interdipendenza delle forme di vita del pianeta è il punto di partenza per l'elaborazione di un concetto di bene comune.

Taylor a differenza di Regan pone delle specifiche – possiamo considerarle anche dei paletti - per considerare quali entità possano "avere interessi", e quali invece non ne hanno.

A questo proposito è utile citare quanto scrive Sergio Bartolommei (1):

“Perché un’entità X possa “avere interessi” e, quindi, un “bene di per sé”, occorre almeno che l’essere in questione abbia per Taylor delle “finalità” da raggiungere (anche se non necessariamente intenzionali-coscienti) e disponga di certi mezzi per raggiungerla. Gli enti inanimati, non avendo fini da perseguire, non possono avere interessi neppure nel senso più ampio della parola ed è impossibile parlare al loro riguardo di un “bene di per sé”. Non avendo interessi, rocce, sabbia e acque non possono essere danneggiati dall’aver i loro interessi frustrati. Gli unici esseri per i quali abbia senso parlare di un bene di per sé diventano quindi per Taylor soltanto gli *organismi viventi*, cioè soltanto quegli esseri che

- a) Presentano caratteristiche specifiche (nel senso che appartengono a una specie): struttura cellulare, funzionamento biologico interno, relazioni esterne con altri organismi e con gli aspetti fisico-chimici dell’ambiente;
- b) Hanno ritmi di crescita e di sviluppo loro propri, per cui è lecito considerare ciascuno di essi come un “centro teleologico di vita perseguente il suo proprio bene nel suo proprio, unico modo”, ovvero si configurano ciascuno come un “sistema unificato e coerente di attività organizzate la cui tendenza costante è di preservare la propria esistenza proteggendo e promuovendo il proprio benessere”.

Taylor definisce “visione biocentrica” questa immagine della natura che fa da supporto a un’etica ambientale in base alla quale soltanto gli organismi viventi (oltre l’uomo, gli animali e le piante) hanno interessi moralmente rilevanti. Piante e animali hanno un “bene di per sé” nel senso che

- a) le loro vite possono essere rese migliori o peggiori dal modo col quale sono trattate dagli agenti morali

- b) gli uomini, in quanto condividono con piante e animali la “comunità di vita sulla terra”, possono assumere il “punto di vista” degli altri esseri viventi e giudicare ciò che accade a questi in termini di benessere delle cose stesse, cioè di ciò che è buono o cattivo, favorevole o sfavorevole per la cosa in questione, e non per qualche altra.

Senza alcun bisogno di ricorrere a visioni animistiche o antropomorfe della natura, una persona biologicamente informata sarà a conoscenza del “ciclo della vita” delle piante e saprà quali sono le condizioni ambientali di cui la pianta ha bisogno (nel senso che sono nell’interesse della pianta) perché essa sopravviva in condizioni ottimali (...)

Da ciò si evince che Taylor per poter elaborare un concetto di giustizia interspecifica (generata dall’immedesimazione dell’Umano(2) con le altre entità viventi) ha bisogno di circoscrivere il campo di azione solo ed esclusivamente agli esseri viventi, e non solo, ma a quei viventi la cui organizzazione interna è simile, potendo comunque giungere anche fino agli esseri unicellulari che non hanno una complessità anatomica e fisiologica paragonabile agli organismi pluricellulari, ma che hanno pur sempre un loro fine.

In ogni caso ciò che mi stimola maggiormente è la capacità di Taylor di spingersi fino a considerare “l’interesse”(3) altrui, ossia di varcare – timidamente - la soglia antropocentrica per dedicarsi all’analisi di soluzioni che possano permetterci di instaurare un reale e efficace approccio con altri

viventi (terrestri potremo dire, viste le caratteristiche che Taylor pone come prerequisiti per poter essere portatori di interessi). Si può tentare di dimostrare la visione non antropocentrica di Taylor considerando il fatto che egli parla di un “centro teleologico di vita perseguitante il suo proprio bene nel suo proprio, unico modo”: questo concetto è sinonimo della volontà di un forte rispetto nei confronti anche di entità che perseguono i propri fini seppur prive di una precisa volontà e consapevolezza (e pertanto possono essere definiti centri teleologici). Con questa definizione Taylor si pone fuori dal pensiero che vuole l’Umano come essere moralmente superiore perché capace di autocoscienza e di discernimento, infatti secondo Taylor anche un lichene ha un suo fine e opera per ottenerlo quantunque senza consapevolezza.

Il concetto di rispetto di Taylor nei confronti dei viventi presenta sostanziali differenze con l’approccio sensiocentrico dell’antispecismo, ritengo, però, che possa risultare molto utile a quest’ultimo per permettergli di ampliare il proprio campo di azione. Se però l’antispecismo incentrato sul sensiocentrismo ha come suo limite i non senzienti, l’idea di Taylor ha come chiaro limite i non viventi in quanto non portatori di interessi (sarebbe inoltre impossibile tentare di immedesimarsi nel vento per cercare di capire quale possano essere i suoi interessi). Il problema non affrontato da Taylor potrebbe essere la sua definizione di immagine della natura come “visione biocentrica”; in realtà egli considera nei suoi punti di partenza “struttura cellulare, funzionamento biologico interno, relazioni esterne con altri organismi e con gli aspetti fisico-chimici dell’ambiente”, e parla anche di “comunità di vita sulla terra”. Il concetto biocentrico di Taylor, pertanto, non si ferma al valore inerente dell’essere vivente, ma ne considera le relazioni

con l'esterno, con altre forme di vita e con l'ambiente, considera pertanto una visione ecologica e sistemica della vita. Pur partendo dal biocentrismo, giungiamo a una visione globale di comunità di vita che non potrebbe sussistere senza complessi e continui scambi di energia con l'ambiente e quindi la porzione non vivente della Terra. Spesso si confonde il concetto di ecocentrismo con visioni olistiche o trascendentali, in realtà l'ecocentrismo pone come valore di riferimento non l'individuo, ma il sistema in cui esso è immerso, cercando di comprendere i complessi flussi di energia che lo governano.

Il biocentrismo individualistico di Taylor, a mio parere, potrebbe servire come ponte per unire il rispetto dell'individuo con il rispetto dell'ambiente-sistema in cui esso vive. Senza voler caricare di significati fondanti la visione biocentrica tayloriana, che è e rimane molto debole in diversi suoi punti, la si può certamente considerare utile alla formulazione di un nuovo concetto antispecista che superi (e l'antispecismo moderno in grande parte lo ha già fatto) l'idea di agente morale e di paziente morale di Regan e il concetto di soggetto-di-una-vita, introducendo il concetto di "punto di vista" altrui, che presuppone un lavoro di immedesimazione e di conseguenza una visione empatica del problema: immedesimandosi e comprendendo le altrui esigenze, si può concepirne il punto di vista altro dal nostro e rispettare gli "interessi" altrui(3) per giungere quindi al rispetto dell'individuo in quanto tale.

Un esercizio importante e fondamentale che Taylor ci propone attraverso la formulazione di cinque principi per un nuovo rapporto Umano/Animale.

Di seguito un mio testo pubblicato nel 2007 sul periodico vegano ed

antispecista Veganzetta (www.veganzetta.org) che illustra brevemente tali principi.

I cinque principi di Taylor

Il nuovo paradigma suggerito dall'antispecismo è la costruzione di una nuova società umana non più verticale come l'attuale, ma orizzontale, dove empatia, giustizia, solidarietà, rispetto, assumono il loro significato più pieno ed inoltre allargato anche a coloro che attualmente non fanno parte della sfera dei "diritti umani". Pensare ad un futuro dove ogni singolo atto può avere ricadute importanti se non nefaste per altri esseri senzienti o in generale viventi, potrebbe rimanere un puro esercizio di stile, se non si adottassero una serie di criteri pratici e comportamentali utili per allargare la sfera morale anche agli altri Animali.

Vorrei incentivare l'avvio di un eventuale dibattito proponendo la soluzione elaborata dal filosofo americano Paul Taylor (P. W. Taylor, "Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics", Princeton University Press, Princeton 1986) negli anni '80; Taylor (ecocentrismo radicale) fornisce una visione che considera un modo di operare fondato sulla species-impartiality (imparzialità tra specie diverse o imparzialità interspecifica), perché a suo avviso è necessario applicare nei rapporti tra specie una assoluta imparzialità di vedute, ma anche "lo stesso valore inerente, perché nessuna è superiore ad un'altra".

Alcuni avrebbero da obiettare che non tutte le specie sono dotate di valore inerente uguale, che alcune di esse evolutivamente più avanzate possono a ragione aspirare a ruoli di primo piano rispetto a molte altre, ad ogni modo riteniamo che la base di partenza del discorso di Taylor non sia il punto di vista biologico, ma una considerazione morale che prefiguri un valore intrinseco dell'essere senziente a prescindere dal suo livello evolutivo. Ecco

quindi che di fronte ad un interesse primario (come il diritto alla vita) di un Lombrico, l'interesse del tutto secondario (e crudele) di un Umano a infilzarlo con un amo per usarlo come esca per catturare ed uccidere altri esseri senzienti (ad esempio una Trota) è del tutto prevalente.

Ciò a prescindere dal livello evolutivo, dalla coscienza di sé del primo soggetto, rispetto al secondo. I diritti a sussistere, a non soffrire, alla libertà, sono diritti preminenti e fondamentali nei confronti dei quali altri diritti divengono secondari anche se ad esigerli è una specie vivente maggiormente evoluta rispetto ad altre. Tornando a Taylor, egli ha formulato 5 principi base per avviare un confronto su di una giustizia interspecifica. Una sorta di prontuario da consultare per determinare i comportamenti da tenere per meglio gestire i rapporti con altre specie animali. I cinque principi proposti da Taylor, non hanno la capacità di risolvere ogni problema che eventualmente potrebbe sorgere nei rapporti con altre specie, ma possono essere un ottimo punto di partenza per ulteriori evoluzioni teoriche utili all'individuazione di una soluzione.

Proponiamo di seguito tali principi cercando di analizzarli indipendentemente da considerazioni sulle posizioni di Taylor e sulla loro vicinanza o lontananza dalle nostre, ma puramente considerandoli per ciò che sono, e per l'eventuale l'utilità che potrebbero avere.

Il primo dei cinque principi di Taylor è il "principio di autodifesa": esso afferma che è legittimo, per tutti gli Animali (ivi compreso l'Umano) reagire se attaccati per proteggere la propria incolumità qualora venisse messa a rischio. Tale principio giunge a prevedere anche l'eliminazione fisica dell'avversario. Un caso concreto potrebbe essere quello di un Umano che si

trovasse - in una situazione di ipotetica società liberata antispecista - di fronte all'attacco di un predatore, e non potesse trovare vie di salvezza se non l'autodifesa. Ciò però sarebbe anche applicato agli altri Animali, quindi un Toro avrebbe tutti i diritti a difendersi qualora attaccato da un Umano intenzionato a fargli del male. Tale principio difficilmente si potrebbe immaginare di poterlo applicare oggi, dato che il valore intrinseco conferito alla vita di un Umano è infinitamente maggiore rispetto a quello di un Toro.

Il secondo principio è quello “della proporzionalità” che prevede la proporzionalità tra gli interessi in gioco in un rapporto: tra di essi prevalgono gli interessi primari rispetto a quelli secondari, indipendentemente dalla specie di appartenenza. L'esempio fornito del Lombrico e del pescatore è calzante. Tale principio è attuabile anche nella società umana antropocentrica, ed è ciò che in pratica gli animalisti radicali, gli antispecisti ed i vegani fanno. Di fronte ad interessi primari quali la salvaguardia dell'esistenza per un Vitello, si sceglie di non mangiarlo.

Terzo principio è quello “del minimo danno”: è senza dubbio il principio più controverso elaborato da Taylor, esso afferma che qualora non si possa fare a meno di attuare una scelta, essa debba essere attuata cercando di arrecare il minimo danno alle altre specie animali (e noi diremmo anche viventi).

Tale principio è in pratica ciò che l'ecologismo propone: riduzione dei danni all'ecosistema terrestre, diminuzione dello sfruttamento delle risorse, ecc... Un principio che se attuato al di fuori di logiche antispeciste potrebbe rivelarsi più un problema che una soluzione.

La discrezionalità di tale questione è palese, quindi a seconda dei rapporti di forza tra specie, il più forte (accade quotidianamente) potrebbe sentirsi in diritto di decidere l'intensità del danno da arrecare e fornirne delle giustificazioni morali (esempio pratico: se non allevassimo gli Animali "da reddito", essi si estinguerebbero; la nostra scelta di comodo secondo tale assurda visione diviene una sorta di tutela della vita altrui). Se però il terzo principio venisse applicato unitamente al primo ed al secondo, e seguendo un'ottica antispecista, potrebbe divenire un utile strumento di analisi dei problemi di rapporti interspecifici. Un esempio per tutti: essendo vegani ci si dovrebbe nutrire di alimenti vegetali che dovrebbero essere coltivati, le modalità di coltivazione potrebbero seguire il terzo principio enunciato, quindi osservare pratiche adatte a non danneggiare (o a danneggiare il meno possibile) le altre specie animali come ad esempio gli Insetti che vivono sulle piante.

Quarto principio, o "principio della giustizia distributiva": tale principio interverrebbe qualora i primi tre non fossero per validi motivi applicabili. Ponendo per assurdo che vi fossero parità di interessi fondamentali tra la specie umana ed un'altra specie animale, il quarto principio impone che non vi sia un canale preferenziale per i diritti della specie umana, ma che si debba valutare il singolo caso in un'ottica molto più ampia secondo possibili benefici o danni per la globalità del pianeta. Si dovrebbe quindi secondo un criterio di imparzialità, valutare se le esigenze dell'una o dell'altra specie in gioco coincidano con quelli dell'ecosistema terrestre, e in base a tale considerazione prendere una decisione.

Il criterio è quello che la comunità dei viventi terrestri dovrebbe sempre uscirne avvantaggiata. Un principio di chiara matrice utilitarista, ma che a ben vedere potrebbe in alcuni casi limite tornare utile.

Il baco del ragionamento sta evidentemente nel fatto che essendo parte in causa l'Umano non riuscirebbe mai ad essere del tutto imparziale.

Quinto ed ultimo principio è quello “della giustizia restitutiva”: esso afferma che qualora fosse assolutamente inevitabile arrecare un danno ad un'altra specie per soddisfare un'esigenza primaria, tale specie ha diritto ad una sorta di risarcimento. Una specie di pedaggio alla natura offesa, un risarcimento per tutti coloro che hanno sofferto, che sono morti a causa nostra. Un risarcimento (nel caso della società umana contemporanea) a posteriori ed assolutamente insufficiente, ma ipoteticamente utile nel contingente in una società umana liberata e orizzontale. L'interesse umano, secondo Taylor, non dovrebbe mai essere posto in primo piano, ma sempre al livello dell'interesse delle altre specie chiamate in causa.

Ciò porrebbe numerosi limiti all'azione umana, limiti segnati da principi di solidarietà e giustizia del tutto sconosciuti attualmente, di difficile attuazione, ma concettualmente validi.

Solo prefigurando un nuovo stile di vita diverso e sostitutivo (non alternativo) all'attuale, si potrebbero considerare tali principi, che però potrebbero già essere impiegati nella quotidianità di tutti coloro che hanno intrapreso la via del veganismo e dell'antispecismo, per aiutare una crescita interiore.

Note:

(1) Sergio Bartolommei, *Etica e ambiente. Il rapporto uomo-natura nella filosofia morale contemporanea di lingua inglese*, Guerini e Associati, 1989

(2) PRECISAZIONI SU ALCUNI TERMINI UTILIZZATI

Alcuni esempi di terminologia adottata

“Umano/i” : non intendo utilizzare il sostantivo maschile “uomo” in quanto termine carico di significati filosofici e culturali e religiosi che volutamente pongono la specie umana al di sopra di altre specie animali, nonché carico di significati di chiara matrice sessista.

“Animale/i”: utilizzo tale sostantivo per facilitare la leggibilità del testo. Il termine “Animali” in realtà è da intendersi sostitutivo di “Animali non Umani”, o “altri Animali”, o “Non Umani”, in sintesi tutte le specie animali diverse dalla specie animale umana. Riconosco a tale termine una valenza assolutamente positiva della Animalità e utilizziamo la “A” maiuscola per sottolineare la dignità intrinseca e pari a quella umana di ogni Animale diverso dall’Animale Umano. “Cane, Maiale, ecc” : utilizzo tali sostantivi con l’iniziale maiuscola per conferire pari dignità tra le diverse specie animali, in relazione a quella Umana.

“Lager per Animali”: qualsiasi luogo (in particolar modo i macelli e gli allevamenti) in cui gli Animali vengono sfruttati, imprigionati ed uccisi per il soddisfacimento di interessi umani.

“Persona vegana etica”: che si astiene per scelta etica da tutte quelle attività e pratiche che possano provocare danno, sfruttamento o morte degli Animali (pertanto anche umani) e che ha una presenza nella società di tipo radicale, attiva e con valenza educativa e di pubblica denuncia.

(3) La questione del concetto di interesse è affrontata da Luisella Battaglia in *Etica e diritti degli animali*, Laterza U.L. 1997, in cui si afferma:

Una parte di grande interesse del volume di Paul Taylor è costituita dalla trattazione dei dilemmi morali che sorgono in caso di conflitto tra diritti e valori umani e interessi dei non umani. Come comportarsi dinanzi ad azioni che risultano nocive per il benessere di altre specie e della comunità di vita nell'ecosistema?

Come risolvere equamente situazioni in cui si fronteggiano pretese morali in competizione, sorte dal conflitto tra etica umana ed etica ambientale?

Cruciale, per intendere il modello di giustizia interspecifica elaborata da Paul Taylor, è la distinzione tra interessi fondamentali e non fondamentali. Preliminare a tale distinzione è, tuttavia, la definizione di interessi: con tale termine vengono designati “tutti quegli oggetti o eventi che servono a preservare o a proteggere in qualche misura il bene di un organismo vivente”. Come interessi fondamentali, in riferimento agli umani, si indicano quelli che persone razionali e competenti valuterebbero come una parte essenziale della loro esistenza in quanto persone. Sono ciò di cui la gente ha bisogno per realizzare quei fini e quei progetti che rendono la vita degna di essere vissuta e che contribuiscono al pieno sviluppo della personalità.

Essi coincidono, dunque, con valori universali o beni primari.

Interessi non fondamentali sono, invece, quei fini particolari che consideriamo degni di essere perseguiti e i mezzi che riteniamo idonei alla realizzazione del nostro personale sistema di valori. Tali interessi variano pertanto da persona a persona, laddove gli interessi fondamentali sono sostanzialmente comuni a tutti.

In riferimento agli interessi umani non fondamentali, Taylor introduce un'ulteriore distinzione tra quelli che sono intrinsecamente incompatibili con un atteggiamento di rispetto per la natura (ad es.. l'uccisione di animali per sport, divertimento, ecc.) e quelli che sono, invece, intrinsecamente compatibili con tale atteggiamento pur se estrinsecamente nocivi agli ecosistemi naturali (ad esempio opere umane quali la costruzione di aeroporti, di autostrade, ecc.. i cui costi possono essere rilevanti per il *Wildlife*).

Per i non umani, fondamentali sono quegli interessi la cui realizzazione è richiesta da un organismo per mantenersi in vita. Secondo Paul Taylor, è possibile per noi formulare giudizi circa l'importanza comparativa degli interessi dei non umani poiché, data una sufficiente informazione fattuale circa il loro benessere, siamo in grado di assumere il loro punto di vista e quindi procedere a una stima ragionevole del tipo di danno o di privazione che subirebbero «ove determinate condizioni fossero assenti dalle loro vite».



THE ETHICS OF RESPECT FOR NATURE

Paul W. Taylor

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HUMAN-CENTERED AND LIFE-CENTERED SYSTEMS OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

When the basic characteristics of the attitude of respect for nature are made clear, it will be seen that a life-centered system of environmental ethics need not be holistic or organicist in its conception of the kinds of entities that are deemed the appropriate objects of moral concern and consideration. Nor does such a system require that the concepts of ecological homeostasis, equilibrium, and integrity provide us with normative principles from which could be derived (with the addition of factual knowledge) our obligations with regard to natural ecosystems. The "balance of nature" is not itself a moral norm, however important may be the role it plays in our general outlook on the natural world that underlies the attitude of respect for nature. I argue that finally it is the good (well-being, welfare) of individual organisms, considered as entities having inherent worth, that determines our moral relations with the Earth's wild communities of life.

In designating the theory to be set forth as life-centered, I intend to contrast it with all anthropocentric views. According to the latter, human actions affecting the natural environment and its nonhuman inhabitants are right (or wrong) by either of two criteria: they have consequences which are favorable (or unfavorable) to human well-being, or they are consistent (or inconsistent) with the system of norms that protect and implement human rights. From this

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human-centered standpoint it is to humans and only to humans that all duties are ultimately owed. We may have responsibilities *with regard to* the natural ecosystems and biotic communities of our planet, but these responsibilities are in every case based on the contingent fact that our treatment of those ecosystems and communities of life can further the realization of human values and/or human rights. We have no obligation to promote or protect the good of nonhuman living things, independently of this contingent fact.

A life-centered system of environmental ethics is opposed to human-centered ones precisely on this point. From the perspective of a life-centered theory, we have *prima facie* moral obligations that are owed to wild plants and animals themselves as members of the Earth's biotic community. We are morally bound (other things being equal) to protect or promote their good for *their sake*. Our duties to respect the integrity of natural ecosystems, to preserve endangered species, and to avoid environmental pollution stem from the fact that these are ways in which we can help make it possible for wild species populations to achieve and maintain a healthy existence in a natural state. Such obligations are due those living things out of recognition of their inherent worth. They are entirely additional to and independent of the obligations we owe to our fellow humans. Although many of the actions that fulfill one set of obligations will also fulfill the other, two different grounds of obligation are involved. Their well-being, as well as human well-being, is something to be realized *as an end in itself*.

If we were to accept a life-centered theory of environmental ethics, a profound reordering of our moral universe would take place. We would begin to look at the whole of the Earth's biosphere in a new light. Our duties with respect to the "world" of nature would be seen as making *prima facie* claims upon us to be balanced against our duties with respect to the "world" of human civilization. We could no longer simply take the human point of view and consider the effects of our actions exclusively from the perspective of our own good. . . .

We can think of the good of an individual nonhuman organism as consisting in the full development of its biological powers. Its good is realized to the extent that it is strong and healthy. It possesses whatever capacities it needs for successfully coping with its environment and so preserving its existence throughout the various stages of the normal life cycle of its species. The good of a population or community of such individuals consists in the population or community maintaining itself from generation to generation as a coherent system of genetically and ecologically related organisms whose average good is at an optimum level for the given environment. (Here *average good* means that the degree of realization of the good of *individual organisms* in the population or community is, on average, greater than would be the case under any other ecologically functioning order of interrelations among those species populations in the given ecosystem.)

The idea of a being having a good of its own, as I understand it, does not entail that the being must . . . take an interest in what affects its life for better

or for worse. We can act in a being's interest or contrary to its interest without its being interested in what we are doing to it in the sense of wanting or not wanting us to do it. It may, indeed, be wholly unaware that favorable and unfavorable events are taking place in its life. I take it that trees, for example, have no knowledge or desires or feelings. Yet it is undoubtedly the case that trees can be harmed or benefited by our actions. We can crush their roots by running a bulldozer too close to them. We can see to it that they get adequate nourishment and moisture by fertilizing and watering the soil around them. Thus we can help or hinder them in the realization of their good. It is the good of trees themselves that is thereby affected. . . .

When construed in this way, the concept of a being's good is not coextensive with sentience or the capacity for feeling pain. William Frankena has argued for a general theory of environmental ethics in which the ground of a creature's being worthy of moral consideration is its sentience. I have offered some criticisms of this view elsewhere, but the full refutation of such a position, it seems to me, finally depends on the positive reasons for accepting a life-centered theory of the kind I am defending in this essay. . . .¹

Since I am concerned only with human treatment of wild organisms, species populations, and communities of life as they occur in our planet's natural ecosystems, it is to those entities alone that the concept "having a good of its own" will here be applied. I am not denying that other living things, whose genetic origin and environmental conditions have been produced, controlled, and manipulated by humans for human ends, do have a good of their own in the same sense as do wild plants and animals. It is not my purpose in this essay, however, to set out or defend the principles that should guide our conduct with regard to their good. It is only insofar as their production and use by humans have good or ill effects upon natural ecosystems and their wild inhabitants that the ethics of respect for nature comes into play. . . .

THE BIOCENTRIC OUTLOOK ON NATURE

[The] belief system underlying the attitude of respect for nature I call (for want of a better name) "the biocentric outlook on nature." Since it is not wholly analyzable into empirically confirmable assertions, it should not be thought of as simply a compendium of the biological sciences concerning our planet's ecosystems. It might best be described as a philosophical world view, to distinguish it from a scientific theory or explanatory system. However, one of its major tenets is the great lesson we have learned from the science of ecology: the interdependence of all living things in an organically unified order whose balance and stability are necessary conditions for the realization of the good of its constituent biotic communities.

Before turning to an account of the main components of the biocentric outlook, it is convenient here to set forth the overall structure of my theory of environmental ethics as it has now emerged. The ethics of respect for nature is

made up of three basic elements: a belief system, an ultimate moral attitude, and a set of rules of duty and standards of character. These elements are connected with each other in the following manner. The belief system provides a certain outlook on nature which supports and makes intelligible an autonomous agent's adopting, as an ultimate moral attitude, the attitude of respect for nature. It supports and makes intelligible the attitude in the sense that, when an autonomous agent understands its moral relations to the natural world in terms of this outlook, it recognizes the attitude of respect to be the only *suitable* or *fitting* attitude to take toward all wild forms of life in the Earth's biosphere. Living things are now viewed as *the appropriate objects of the attitude of respect* and are accordingly regarded as entities possessing inherent worth. One then places intrinsic value on the promotion and protection of their good. As a consequence of this, one makes a moral commitment to abide by a set of rules of duty and to fulfill (as far as one can by one's own efforts) certain standards of good character. Given one's adoption of the attitude of respect, one makes that moral commitment because one considers those rules and standards to be validly binding on all moral agents. They are seen as embodying forms of conduct and character structures in which the attitude of respect for nature is manifested.

This three-part complex which internally orders the ethics of respect for nature is symmetrical with a theory of human ethics grounded on respect for persons. Such a theory includes, first, a conception of oneself and others as persons, that is, as centers of autonomous choice. Second, there is the attitude of respect for persons as persons. When this is adopted as an ultimate moral attitude it involves the disposition to treat every person as having inherent worth or "human dignity." Every human being, just in virtue of her or his humanity, is understood to be worthy of moral consideration, and intrinsic value is placed on the autonomy and well-being of each. This is what Kant meant by conceiving of persons as ends in themselves. Third, there is an ethical system of duties which are acknowledged to be owed by everyone to everyone. These duties are forms of conduct in which public recognition is given to each individual's inherent worth as a person.

This structural framework for a theory of human ethics is meant to leave open the issue of consequentialism (utilitarianism) versus nonconsequentialism (deontology). That issue concerns the particular kind of system of rules defining the duties of moral agents toward persons. Similarly, I am leaving open in this paper the question of what particular kind of system of rules defines our duties with respect to the natural world.

The biocentric outlook on nature has four main components. (1) Humans are thought of as members of the Earth's community of life, holding that membership on the same terms as apply to all the nonhuman members. (2) The Earth's natural ecosystems as a totality are seen as a complex web of interconnected elements, with the sound biological functioning of each being dependent on the sound biological functioning of the others. (This is the component referred to above as the great lesson that the science of ecology has taught us.) (3) Each individual organism is conceived of as a teleological

center of life, pursuing its own good in its own way. (4) Whether we are concerned with standards of merit or with the concept of inherent worth, the claim that humans by their very nature are superior to other species is a groundless claim and, in the light of elements (1), (2), and (3) above, must be rejected as nothing more than an irrational bias in our own favor.

The conjunction of these four ideas constitutes the biocentric outlook on nature. In the remainder of this paper I give a brief account of the first three components, followed by a more detailed analysis of the fourth. I then conclude by indicating how this outlook provides a way of justifying the attitude of respect for nature.

HUMANS AS MEMBERS OF THE EARTH'S COMMUNITY OF LIFE

We share with other species a common relationship to the Earth. In accepting the biocentric outlook we take the fact of our being an animal species to be a fundamental feature of our existence. We consider it an essential aspect of "the human condition." We do not deny the differences between ourselves and other species, but we keep in the forefront of our consciousness the fact that in relation to our planet's natural ecosystems we are but one species population among many. Thus we acknowledge our origin in the very same evolutionary process that gave rise to all other species and we recognize ourselves to be confronted with similar environmental challenges to those that confront them. The laws of genetics, of natural selection, and of adaptation apply equally to all of us as biological creatures. In this light we consider ourselves as one with them, not set apart from them. We, as well as they, must face certain basic conditions of existence that impose requirements on us for our survival and well-being. Each animal and plant is like us in having a good of its own. Although our human good (what is of true value in human life, including the exercise of individual autonomy in choosing our own particular value systems) is not like the good of a nonhuman animal or plant, it can no more be realized than their good can without the biological necessities for survival and physical health.

When we look at ourselves from the evolutionary point of view, we see that not only are we very recent arrivals on Earth, but that our emergence as a new species on the planet was originally an event of no particular importance to the entire scheme of things. The Earth was teeming with life long before we appeared. Putting the point metaphorically, we are relative newcomers, entering a home that has been the residence of others for hundreds of millions of years, a home that must now be shared by all of us together.

The comparative brevity of human life on Earth may be vividly depicted by imagining the geological time scale in spatial terms. Suppose we start with algae, which have been around for at least 600 million years. (The earliest protozoa actually predated this by several *billion* years.) If the time that algae have been here were represented by the length of a football field (300 feet), then

the period during which sharks have been swimming in the world's oceans and spiders have been spinning their webs would occupy three quarters of the length of the field; reptiles would show up at about the center of the field; mammals would cover the last third of the field; hominids (mammals of the family *Hominidae*) the last two feet; and the species *Homo sapiens* the last six inches.

Whether this newcomer is able to survive as long as other species remains to be seen. But there is surely something presumptuous about the way humans look down on the "lower" animals, especially those that have become extinct. We consider the dinosaurs, for example, to be biological failures, though they existed on our planet for 65 million years. One writer has made the point with beautiful simplicity:

We sometimes speak of the dinosaurs as failures; there will be time enough for that judgment when we have lasted even for one tenth as long. . . .²

The possibility of the extinction of the human species, a possibility which starkly confronts us in the contemporary world, makes us aware of another respect in which we should not consider ourselves privileged beings in relation to other species. This is the fact that the well-being of humans is dependent upon the ecological soundness and health of many plant and animal communities, while their soundness and health does not in the least depend upon human well-being. Indeed, from their standpoint the very existence of humans is quite unnecessary. Every last man, woman, and child could disappear from the face of the Earth without any significant detrimental consequence for the good of wild animals and plants. On the contrary, many of them would be greatly benefited. The destruction of their habitats by human "developments" would cease. The poisoning and polluting of their environment would come to an end. The Earth's land, air, and water would no longer be subject to the degradation they are now undergoing as the result of large-scale technology and uncontrolled population growth. Life communities in natural ecosystems would gradually return to their former healthy state. Tropical forests, for example, would again be able to make their full contribution to a life-sustaining atmosphere for the whole planet. The rivers, lakes, and oceans of the world would (perhaps) eventually become clean again. Spilled oil, plastic trash, and even radioactive waste might finally, after many centuries, cease doing their terrible work. Ecosystems would return to their proper balance, suffering only the disruptions of natural events such as volcanic eruptions and glaciation. From these the community of life could recover, as it has so often done in the past. But the ecological disasters now perpetrated on it by humans—disasters from which it might never recover—these it would no longer have to endure.

If, then, the total, final, absolute extermination of our species (by our own hands?) should take place and if we should not carry all the others with us into oblivion, not only would the Earth's community of life continue to exist, but in all probability its well-being would be enhanced. Our presence, in

short, is not needed. If we were to take the standpoint of the community and give voice to its true interest, the ending of our six-inch epoch would most likely be greeted with a hearty "Good riddance!"

THE NATURAL WORLD AS AN ORGANIC SYSTEM

To accept the biocentric outlook and regard ourselves and our place in the world from its perspective is to see the whole natural order of the Earth's biosphere as a complex but unified web of interconnected organisms, objects, and events. The ecological relationships between any community of living things and their environment form an organic whole of functionally interdependent parts. Each ecosystem is a small universe itself in which the interactions of its various species populations comprise an intricately woven network of cause-effect relations. Such dynamic but at the same time relatively stable structures as food chains, predator-prey relations, and plant succession in a forest are self-regulating, energy-recycling mechanisms that preserve the equilibrium of the whole.

As far as the well-being of wild animals and plants is concerned, this ecological equilibrium must not be destroyed. The same holds true of the well-being of humans. When one views the realm of nature from the perspective of the biocentric outlook, one never forgets that in the long run the integrity of the entire biosphere of our planet is essential to the realization of the good of its constituent communities of life, both human and nonhuman.

Although the importance of this idea cannot be overemphasized, it is by now so familiar and so widely acknowledged that I shall not further elaborate on it here. However, I do wish to point out that this "holistic" view of the Earth's ecological systems does not itself constitute a moral norm. It is a factual aspect of biological reality, to be understood as a set of causal connections in ordinary empirical terms. Its significance for humans is the same as its significance for nonhumans, namely, in setting basic conditions for the realization of the good of living things. Its ethical implications for our treatment of the natural environment lie entirely in the fact that our *knowledge* of these causal connections is an essential *means* to fulfilling the aims we set for ourselves in adopting the attitude of respect for nature. In addition, its theoretical implications for the ethics of respect for nature lie in the fact that it (along with the other elements of the biocentric outlook) makes the adopting of that attitude a rational and intelligible thing to do.

INDIVIDUAL ORGANISMS AS TELEOLOGICAL CENTERS OF LIFE

As our knowledge of living things increases, as we come to a deeper understanding of their life cycles, their interactions with other organisms, and the manifold ways in which they adjust to the environment, we become more fully

aware of how each of them is carrying out its biological functions according to the laws of its species-specific nature. But besides this, our increasing knowledge and understanding also develop in us a sharpened awareness of the uniqueness of each individual organism. Scientists who have made careful studies of particular plants and animals, whether in the field or in laboratories, have often acquired a knowledge of their subjects as identifiable individuals. Close observation over extended periods of time has led them to an appreciation of the unique "personalities" of their subjects. Sometimes a scientist may come to take a special interest in a particular animal or plant, all the while remaining strictly objective in the gathering and recording of data. Nonscientists may likewise experience this development of interest when, as amateur naturalists, they make accurate observations over sustained periods of close acquaintance with an individual organism. As one becomes more and more familiar with the organism and its behavior, one becomes fully sensitive to the particular way it is living out its life cycle. One may become fascinated by it and even experience some involvement with its good and bad fortunes (that is, with the occurrence of environmental conditions favorable or unfavorable to the realization of its good). The organism comes to mean something to one as a unique, irreplaceable individual. The final culmination of this process is the achievement of a genuine understanding of its point of view and, with that understanding, an ability to "take" that point of view. *Conceiving of it as a center of life, one is able to look at the world from its perspective.*

This development from objective knowledge to the recognition of individuality, and from the recognition of individuality to full awareness of an organism's standpoint, is a process of heightening our consciousness of what it means to be an individual living thing. We grasp the particularity of the organism as a teleological center of life, striving to preserve itself and to realize its own good in its own unique way.

It is to be noted that we need not be falsely anthropomorphizing when we conceive of individual plants and animals in this manner. Understanding them as teleological centers of life does not necessitate "reading into" them human characteristics. We need not, for example, consider them to have consciousness. Some of them may be aware of the world around them and others may not. Nor need we deny that different kinds and levels of awareness are exemplified when consciousness in some form is present. But conscious or not, all are equally teleological centers of life in the sense that each is a unified system of goal-oriented activities directed toward their preservation and well-being.

When considered from an ethical point of view, a teleological center of life is an entity whose "world" can be viewed from the perspective of *its* life. In looking at the world from that perspective we recognize objects and events occurring in its life as being beneficent, maleficent, or indifferent. The first are occurrences which increase its powers to preserve its existence and realize its good. The second decrease or destroy those powers. The third have neither of these effects on the entity. With regard to our human role as moral agents, we

can conceive of a teleological center of life as a being whose standpoint we can take in making judgments about what events in the world are good or evil, desirable or undesirable. In making those judgments it is what promotes or protects the being's own good, not what benefits moral agents themselves, that sets the standard of evaluation. Such judgments can be made about anything that happens to the entity which is favorable or unfavorable in relation to its good. As was pointed out earlier, the entity itself need not have any (conscious) *interest* in what is happening to it for such judgments to be meaningful and true.

It is precisely judgments of this sort that we are disposed to make when we take the attitude of respect for nature. In adopting that attitude those judgments are given weight as reasons for action in our practical deliberation. They become morally relevant facts in the guidance of our conduct.

THE DENIAL OF HUMAN SUPERIORITY

This fourth component of the biocentric outlook on nature is the single most important idea in establishing the justifiability of the attitude of respect for nature. Its central role is due to the special relationship it bears to the first three components of the outlook. This relationship will be brought out after the concept of human superiority is examined and analyzed.³

In what sense are humans alleged to be superior to other animals? We are different from them in having certain capacities that they lack. But why should these capacities be a mark of superiority? From what point of view are they judged to be signs of superiority and what sense of superiority is meant? After all, various nonhuman species have capacities that humans lack. There is the speed of a cheetah, the vision of an eagle, the agility of a monkey. Why should not these be taken as signs of *their* superiority over humans?

One answer that comes immediately to mind is that these capacities are not as *valuable* as the human capacities that are claimed to make us superior. Such uniquely human characteristics as rational thought, aesthetic creativity, autonomy and self-determination, and moral freedom, it might be held, have a higher value than the capacities found in other species. Yet we must ask: valuable to whom, and on what grounds?

The human characteristics mentioned are all valuable to humans. They are essential to the preservation and enrichment of our civilization and culture. Clearly it is from the human standpoint that they are being judged to be desirable and good. It is not difficult here to recognize a begging of the question. Humans are claiming human superiority from a strictly human point of view, that is, from a point of view in which the good of humans is taken as the standard of judgment. All we need to do is to look at the capacities of nonhuman animals (or plants, for that matter) from the standpoint of *their* good to find a contrary judgment of superiority. The speed of the cheetah, for example, is a sign of its superiority to humans when considered from the standpoint of the good of its species. If it were as slow a runner as a human, it would

not be able to survive. And so for all the other abilities of nonhumans which further their good but which are lacking in humans. In each case the claim to human superiority would be rejected from a nonhuman standpoint.

When superiority assertions are interpreted in this way, they are based on judgments of *merit*. To judge the merits of a person or an organism one must apply grading or ranking standards to it. (As I show below, this distinguishes judgments of merit from judgments of inherent worth.) Empirical investigation then determines whether it has the "good-making properties" (merits) in virtue of which it fulfills the standards being applied. In the case of humans, merits may be either moral or nonmoral. We can judge one person to be better than (superior to) another from the moral point of view by applying certain standards to their character and conduct. Similarly, we can appeal to nonmoral criteria in judging someone to be an excellent piano player, a fair cook, a poor tennis player, and so on. Different social purposes and roles are implicit in the making of such judgments, providing the frame of reference for the choice of standards by which the nonmoral merits of people are determined. Ultimately such purposes and roles stem from a society's way of life as a whole. Now a society's way of life may be thought of as the cultural form given to the realization of human values. Whether moral or nonmoral standards are being applied, then, all judgments of people's merits finally depend on human values. All are made from an exclusively human standpoint.

The question that naturally arises at this juncture is: why should standards that are based on human values be assumed to be the only valid criteria of merit and hence the only true signs of superiority? This question is especially pressing when humans are being judged superior in merit to nonhumans. It is true that a human being may be a better mathematician than a monkey, but the monkey may be a better tree climber than a human being. If we humans value mathematics more than tree climbing, that is because our conception of civilized life makes the development of mathematical ability more desirable than the ability to climb trees. But is it not unreasonable to judge nonhumans by the values of human civilization, rather than by values connected with what it is for a member of *that* species to live a good life? If all living things have a good of their own, it at least makes sense to judge the merits of nonhumans by standards derived from *their* good. To use only standards based on human values is already to commit oneself to holding that humans are superior to nonhumans, which is the point in question.

A further logical flaw arises in connection with the widely held conviction that humans are *morally* superior beings because they possess, while others lack, the capacities of a moral agent (free will, accountability, deliberation, judgment, practical reason). This view rests on a conceptual confusion. As far as moral standards are concerned, only beings that have the capacities of a moral agent can properly be judged to be *either* moral (morally good) *or* immoral (morally deficient). Moral standards are simply not applicable to beings that lack such capacities. Animals and plants cannot therefore be said to be morally inferior in merit to humans. Since the only beings that can have

moral merits *or be deficient in such merits* are moral agents, it is conceptually incoherent to judge humans as superior to nonhumans on the ground that humans have moral capacities while nonhumans don't.

Up to this point I have been interpreting the claim that humans are superior to other living things as a grading or ranking judgment regarding their comparative merits. There is, however, another way of understanding the idea of human superiority. According to this interpretation, humans are superior to nonhumans not as regards their merits but as regards their inherent worth. Thus the claim of human superiority is to be understood as asserting that all humans, simply in virtue of their humanity, have a *greater inherent worth* than other living things.

The inherent worth of an entity does not depend on its merits.⁴ To consider something as possessing inherent worth, we have seen, is to place intrinsic value on the realization of its good. This is done regardless of whatever particular merits it might have or might lack, as judged by a set of grading or ranking standards. In human affairs, we are all familiar with the principle that one's worth as a person does not vary with one's merits or lack of merits. The same can hold true of animals and plants. To regard such entities as possessing inherent worth entails disregarding their merits and deficiencies, whether they are being judged from a human standpoint or from the standpoint of their own species.

The idea of one entity having more merit than another, and so being superior to it in merit, makes perfectly good sense. Merit is a grading or ranking concept, and judgments of comparative merit are based on the different degrees to which things satisfy a given standard. But what can it mean to talk about one thing being superior to another in inherent worth? In order to get at what is being asserted in such a claim it is helpful first to look at the social origin of the concept of degrees of inherent worth.

The idea that humans can possess different degrees of inherent worth originated in societies having rigid class structures. Before the rise of modern democracies with their egalitarian outlook, one's membership in a hereditary class determined one's social status. People in the upper classes were looked up to, while those in the lower classes were looked down upon. In such a society one's social superiors and social inferiors were clearly defined and easily recognized.

Two aspects of these class-structured societies are especially relevant to the idea of degrees of inherent worth. First, those born into the upper classes were deemed more worthy of respect than those born into the lower orders. Second, the superior worth of upper class people had nothing to do with their merits nor did the inferior worth of those in the lower classes rest on their lack of merits. One's superiority or inferiority entirely derived from a social position one was born into. The modern concept of a meritocracy simply did not apply. One could not advance into a higher class by any sort of moral or nonmoral achievement. Similarly, an aristocrat held his title and all the privileges that went with it just because he was the eldest son of a titled

nobleman. Unlike the bestowing of knighthood in contemporary Great Britain, one did not earn membership in the nobility by meritorious conduct.

We who live in modern democracies no longer believe in such hereditary social distinctions. Indeed, we would wholeheartedly condemn them on moral grounds as being fundamentally unjust. We have come to think of class systems as a paradigm of social injustice, it being a central principle of the democratic way of life that among humans there are no superiors and no inferiors. Thus we have rejected the whole conceptual framework in which people are judged to have different degrees of inherent worth. That idea is incompatible with our notion of human equality based on the doctrine that all humans, simply in virtue of their humanity, have the same inherent worth. (The belief in universal human rights is one form that this egalitarianism takes.)

The vast majority of people in modern democracies, however, do not maintain an egalitarian outlook when it comes to comparing human beings with other living things. Most people consider our own species to be superior to all other species and this superiority is understood to be a matter of inherent worth, not merit. There may exist thoroughly vicious and depraved humans who lack all merit. Yet because they are human they are thought to belong to a higher class of entities than any plant or animal. That one is born into the species *Homo sapiens* entitles one to have lordship over those who are one's inferiors, namely, those born into other species. The parallel with hereditary social classes is very close. Implicit in this view is a hierarchical conception of nature according to which an organism has a position of superiority or inferiority in the Earth's community of life simply on the basis of its genetic background. The "lower" orders of life are looked down upon and it is considered perfectly proper that they serve the interests of those belonging to the highest order, namely humans. The intrinsic value we place on the well-being of our fellow humans reflects our recognition of their rightful position as our equals. No such intrinsic value is to be placed on the good of other animals, unless we choose to do so out of fondness or affection for them. But their well-being imposes no moral requirement on us. In this respect there is an absolute difference in moral status between ourselves and them.

This is the structure of concepts and beliefs that people are committed to insofar as they regard humans to be superior in inherent worth to all other species. I now wish to argue that this structure of concepts and beliefs is completely groundless. If we accept the first three components of the biocentric outlook and from that perspective look at the major philosophical traditions which have supported that structure, we find it to be at bottom nothing more than the expression of an irrational bias in our own favor. The philosophical traditions themselves rest on very questionable assumptions or else simply beg the question. I briefly consider three of the main traditions to substantiate the point. These are classical Greek humanism, Cartesian dualism, and the Judeo-Christian concept of the Great Chain of Being.

The inherent superiority of humans over other species was implicit in the Greek definition of man as a rational animal. Our animal nature was identified

with "brute" desires that need the order and restraint of reason to rule them (just as reason is the special virtue of those who rule in the ideal state). Rationality was then seen to be the key to our superiority over animals. It enables us to live on a higher plane and endows us with a nobility and worth that other creatures lack. This familiar way of comparing humans with other species is deeply ingrained in our Western philosophical outlook. The point to consider here is that this view does not actually provide an argument *for* human superiority but rather makes explicit the framework of thought that is implicitly used by those who think of humans as inherently superior to nonhumans. The Greeks who held that humans, in virtue of their rational capacities, have a kind of worth greater than that of any nonrational being, never looked at rationality as but one capacity of living things among many others. But when we consider rationality from the standpoint of the first three elements of the ecological outlook, we see that its value lies in its importance for *human* life. Other creatures achieve their species-specific good without the need of rationality, although they often make use of capacities that humans lack. So the humanistic outlook of classical Greek thought does not give us a neutral (non-question-begging) ground on which to construct a scale of degrees of inherent worth possessed by different species of living things.

The second tradition, centering on the Cartesian dualism of soul and body, also fails to justify the claim to human superiority. That superiority is supposed to derive from the fact that we have souls while animals do not. Animals are mere automata and lack the divine element that makes us spiritual beings. I won't go into the now familiar criticisms of this two-substance view. I only add the point that, even if humans are composed of an immaterial, unextended soul and a material, extended body, this in itself is not a reason to deem them of greater worth than entities that are only bodies. Why is a soul substance a thing that adds value to its possessor? Unless some theological reasoning is offered here (which many, including myself, would find unacceptable on epistemological grounds), no logical connection is evident. An immaterial something which thinks is better than a material something which does not think only if thinking itself has value, either intrinsically or instrumentally. Now it is intrinsically valuable to humans alone, who value it as an end in itself, and it is instrumentally valuable to those who benefit from it, namely humans.

For animals that neither enjoy thinking for its own sake nor need it for living the kind of life for which they are best adapted, it has no value. Even if "thinking" is broadened to include all forms of consciousness, there are still many living things that can do without it and yet live what is for their species a good life. The anthropocentricity underlying the claim to human superiority runs throughout Cartesian dualism.

A third major source of the idea of human superiority is the Judeo-Christian concept of the Great Chain of Being. Humans are superior to animals and plants because their Creator has given them a higher place on the chain. It begins with God at the top, and then moves to the angels, who are

lower than God but higher than humans, then to humans, positioned between the angels and the beasts (partaking of the nature of both), and then on down to the lower levels occupied by nonhuman animals, plants, and finally inanimate objects. Humans, being "made in God's image," are inherently superior to animals and plants by virtue of their being closer (in their essential nature) to God.

The metaphysical and epistemological difficulties with this conception of a hierarchy of entities are, in my mind, insuperable. Without entering into this matter here, I only point out that if we are unwilling to accept the metaphysics of traditional Judaism and Christianity, we are again left without good reasons for holding to the claim of inherent human superiority.

The foregoing considerations (and others like them) leave us with but one ground for the assertion that a human being, regardless of merit, is a higher kind of entity than any other living thing. This is the mere fact of the genetic makeup of the species *Homo sapiens*. But this is surely irrational and arbitrary. Why should the arrangement of genes of a certain type be a mark of superior value, especially when this fact about an organism is taken by itself, unrelated to any other aspect of its life? We might just as well refer to any other genetic makeup as a ground of superior value. Clearly we are confronted here with a wholly arbitrary claim that can only be explained as an irrational bias in our own favor.

That the claim is nothing more than a deep-seated prejudice is brought home to us when we look at our relation to other species in the light of the first three elements of the biocentric outlook. Those elements taken jointly give us a certain overall view of the natural world and of the place of humans in it. When we take this view we come to understand other living things, their environmental conditions, and their ecological relationships in such a way as to awake in us a deep sense of our kinship with them as fellow members of the Earth's community of life. Humans and nonhumans alike are viewed together as integral parts of one unified whole in which all living things are functionally interrelated. Finally, when our awareness focuses on the individual lives of plants and animals, each is seen to share with us the characteristic of being a teleological center of life striving to realize its own good in its own good in its own unique way.

As this entire belief system becomes part of the conceptual framework through which we understand and perceive the world, we come to see ourselves as bearing a certain moral relation to nonhuman forms of life. Our ethical role in nature takes on a new significance. We begin to look at other species as we look at ourselves, seeing them as beings which have a good they are striving to realize just as we have a good we are striving to realize. We accordingly develop the disposition to view the world from the standpoint of their good as well as from the standpoint of our own good. Now if the groundlessness of the claim that humans are inherently superior to other species were brought clearly before our minds, we would not remain intellectually neutral toward that claim but would reject it as being fundamentally at variance with

many of the same ends which those who ascribe rights to animals or plants wish to accomplish. There is no reason, moreover, why plants and animals, including whole species populations and life communities, cannot be accorded *legal* rights under my theory. To grant them legal protection could be interpreted as giving them legal entitlement to be protected, and this, in fact, would be a means by which a society that subscribed to the ethics of respect for nature could give public recognition to their inherent worth.

There remains the problem of competing claims, even when wild plants and animals are not thought of as bearers of moral rights. If we accept the bio-centric outlook and accordingly adopt the attitude of respect for nature as our ultimate moral attitude, how do we resolve conflicts that arise from our respect for persons in the domain of human ethics and our respect for nature in the domain of environmental ethics? This is a question that cannot adequately be dealt with here. My main purpose in this paper has been to try to establish a base point from which we can start working toward a solution to the problem. I have shown why we cannot just begin with an initial presumption in favor of the interests of our own species. It is after all within our power as moral beings to place limits on human population and technology with the deliberate intention of sharing the Earth's bounty with other species. That such sharing is an ideal difficult to realize even in an approximate way does not take away it's claim to our deepest moral commitment.

NOTES

1. See W. K. Frankena, "Ethics and the Environment," in K. E. Goodpaster and K. M. Sayre, eds., *Ethics and Problems of the 21st Century* (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), pp. 3-20. I critically examine Frankena's views in "Frankena on Environmental Ethics," *Monist*, Vol. 64, No. 3 (July 1981), pp. 313-24.
2. Stephen R. L. Clark, *The Moral Status of Animals* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 112.
3. My criticisms of the dogma of human superiority gain independent support from a carefully reasoned essay by R. and V. Routley showing the many logical weaknesses in arguments for human-centered theories of environmental ethics. R. and V. Routley, "Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism," in K. E. Goodpaster and K. M. Sayre, eds., *Ethics and Problems of the 21st Century* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), pp. 36-59.
4. For this way of distinguishing between merit and inherent worth, I am indebted to Gregory Vlastos, "Justice and Equality," in R. Brandt, ed., *Social Justice* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962), pp. 31-72.